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Some Reflections on the History of Reserve Forces in the United Kingdom

The last decade has seen profound changes in the organisation and role of the UK's Reserve forces.¹ Until the end of the Cold War Reserve forces were essentially designed as auxiliaries for use in times of major crisis and wars of national survival. But the years since 1991 saw reservists increasingly deployed on wars of choice such as in Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Future Reserves 2020 programme addressed this mismatch by integrating Reserves and Regulars in the 'Whole Force Approach'. Undoubtedly, this was a necessary reform in the light of the changing strategic and social environment. However, there is always the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. This appendix seeks to provide some historical context for the current situation, highlighting some enduring themes that remain of relevance to Reserve Forces in the 2020s.

During Twentieth Century, Britain used its Reserve forces as a framework for the expansion of the armed forces in time of crisis. British foreign policy before 1914, which aligned the UK with France and Russia against Germany (without a formal alliance), was out of synch with defence policy. This was an example of political expediency producing strategic illiteracy; for the obvious corollary to Britain's foreign policy was the creation of a mass army to fight alongside its partners on the European continent. This did not happen. Thus in 1914 the newly-appointed Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, who understood the strategic situation all too well, had to improvise a continental-sized army. In the absence of detailed pre-war plans, Kitchener chose not to rely purely on using the existing framework of the Territorial Force. Instead, he created the 'New' or 'Kitchener' Armies, which grew in parallel with the expansion of the Territorials, leading to some inefficiency and duplication of effort. The strategic and human consequences of these flawed pre-war decisions were profound.

In the Second World War things were handled rather better – up to a point. For instance, the Auxiliary Air Force was created after the First World War and was supplemented by the formation of the Air Force Volunteer Reserve in 1936, as war with Germany grew more likely.² Based on the experience of 1914-18, the decision was taken in the interwar period to expand a future army solely using the extant Territorial structure. However, the Chamberlain government's decision in the spring of 1939 to double the size of the Territorial Army (as it had been renamed) had a deleterious impact on the TA. This decision was taken on political and not military grounds, and left the Territorials simultaneously coping with a mass of fresh volunteers, setting up new units, and training existing part-time soldiers – all with insufficient equipment. Nevertheless, there was less improvisation in 1939-40 than there had been in the comparable situation of 1914-15. Although bedevilled by practical problems, and exacerbated by political expediency, the pre-war decision to plan for the use of Reserve forces as the basis for expansion of the armed forces in time of national emergency was clearly sound.

In the early months of both world wars, Reservists made up a considerable portion of the mobilised armed forces, especially in the Army. In August 1914 as many as 60% of the personnel of infantry battalions were ex-Regulars recalled to the colours, and in 1915 and 1939-40 Territorial units and formations comprised significant accretions of strength to the British armies deployed to France and Belgium. The consequence was that, fighting alongside the Regulars, Reservists suffered heavy losses on operations and had to be replaced in turn by volunteers and conscripts from civilian life. This situation has potential parallels with the current situation. The refiguring of the Reserve from 2010 onwards to be more closely integrated with the Regulars has produced a situation where the armed forces lack strength in depth. At present the prospect of the UK being involved in a sizeable, prolonged, and personnel-intensive conflict which results in casualties that are significant (by contemporary if not historic standards), appears remote. However, there is no guarantee that this situation will continue to be the case for ever more. At the very least it would be prudent to have plans for significant

1. It is important to differentiate between 'Reservists', former Regulars who as part of their terms of service were liable to be recalled to the colours in times of emergency, perhaps undergoing a certain amount of training during their time on the reserve; and part-time service personnel who combined military service with civilian life. The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Royal Auxiliary Air Force and Territorial Army were examples of the latter category, and unless otherwise specified, it is personnel of this type that is referred to in this piece. Arguably, recent developments, including the discontinuing of distinctive Royal Naval Reserve insignia, and adoption of the term 'Army Reserve', albeit subdivided in 'Army Reserve Soldiers' and 'Regular Reservists', have blurred the distinctions. <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/the-army-reserve/> viewed 16 June 2021.

expansion of the Reserve forces. In that sense, in some future emergency it would be vastly preferable to be in the position of the UK in 1939 rather than the UK of 1914.

Historically, the culture of Reserve forces has been rather different from that of their Regular counterparts. Even in Regular units, individuals did not automatically abandon civilian attitudes and ways of behaving upon enlisting. The Regular services provided a 'total' environment and this, combined with a process of training designed to break down and remould personalities, tended to produce a particular culture. For Reservists, who for most of the year returned home after duty and slept in their own beds, it was a different matter. They tended to remain 'citizens (or civilians) in uniform'. For example, relations between the ranks were often markedly less formal than in Regular units, and there was less emphasis on external aspects of discipline. This difference in culture was both a strength and a weakness. It could produce very high levels of unit cohesion in the sense of comradeship, and that people who found that military life was not to their taste could leave with relative ease. However, when Regular NCOs or officers arrived at Reserve units, this could result in mutual culture shock if they came in with a 'new broom' approach. Reserve units had to be handled carefully to get the best out of them. At least in times of peace, many, perhaps most, Regulars posted in realised this and adapted their approach accordingly. Some did not, with unhappy results.

One unavoidable disadvantage for Reservists was that they could not train as often as Regulars. In both 1914 and 1939 Reserve units required intensive training upon mobilisation to get to the required standard. In 1914 and 1915 entire Territorial units, brigades and divisions were sent on active service with inadequate training and suffered as a consequence. The same was true of some Territorials deployed to Norway and France in 1940. During the two world wars, Regular fears about the quality of Territorial training contributed to worries, justified or not, about the effectiveness of Territorials, especially officers. This in turn led to a glass ceiling on promotion. It was difficult for a Territorial officer to rise to 1 Star level, exceptionally rare to get to 2 Star, and impossible to get beyond that. In contrast to the wartime Australian and Canadian armies, both essentially built upon the equivalents of the Territorials and where non-professional soldiers could rise to high command, the British Regular Army effectively excluded citizen officers, no matter how talented, from its highest ranks.

A similar distrust of what were perceived as 'amateurs' in the two world wars led to colonisation of Territorial units by Regular officers and NCOs. In 1939-40, for example, a number of commanders of Territorial infantry battalions were removed. This was not necessarily a reflection on the quality of the individuals concerned – one had a Victoria Cross from the First World War and a distinguished record as a commander – but was the consequence of a belief that part-time commanders could not possibly be as efficient as Regulars who devoted all of their working hours to the role. Although undoubtedly unfair on individuals, this policy was underpinned by some ruthless logic: the stakes were too high to take risks. In the latter stages of both the 1914-18 and 1939-45 wars, non-professional officers (including pre-war Territorials) who had demonstrated their leadership credentials within the total environment of the Army, were able to gain promotion – although, as already noted, only up to a certain level of seniority.

The clash of cultures between Reserve and Regular forces has been expressed in rivalries, banter, and competition, mostly healthy. Sometimes this had a nasty edge. In the late 1930s, men of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve who joined as sergeants were treated with hostility by some long service Regular RAF sergeants, who had, as they saw it, earned their stripes the hard way. Volunteers for the Reserve forces members have usually admired the skill and professionalism of their Professional counterparts, but on occasion felt undervalued, as in the early Twenty-First century nickname 'ARABS' – Arrogant Regular Army Bastards.

2. Both organisations were later given the 'Royal' prefix.

3. Timothy Edmunds, Antonia Dawes, Paul Higate, K. Neil Jenkins & Rachel Woodward (2016) 'Reserve forces and the transformation of British military organisation: soldiers, citizens and society', *Defence Studies*, 16:2, (2016), p.120

4. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/885861/Armed_Forces_Continuous_Attitude_Survey_2020_Main_Report.pdf, viewed 16 June 2021

5. Ian F.W. Beckett, *The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991) p.221.

6. Wishing to avoid conscription was also a motive.

This was a response to the Regular jibe of 'STABS' – Stupid TA Bastards. Clearly, if genuinely integrated armed forces were to be created, cultural barriers needed to be overcome. It seems that the campaigns of the last three decades, when Reservists deployed in significant numbers, especially on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (28,000 between 1997 and 2008³), have taken large steps to doing just that. The 2020 Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey shows that of Regular personnel from all services 'have had working contact with Armed Forces Reserves' and 74% viewed Reserves as 'Professional', 73% as 'Valuable' and 66% as 'Well-integrated'. All these figures represented a slight improvement on those of the previous year, with Army personnel in particular showing a more positive view of Reserves.⁴ All this marks a significant alteration in attitudes from the historical norm.

In years gone by, Reservists and Reserve forces were more visible and had a greater connection to wider society. More generally, they were (and are) a bridge between the military and civilian worlds. However, voluntary service in Reserve forces has always been a niche interest. The was true even in the Edwardian period when in many ways circumstances were very favourable. The Territorial Force, created in 1908, rose to a strength of 269,000 in 1909, but declined to 246,000 in 1913. Both figures were far short of the original target, and re-enlistment rates were low.⁵ However Reserve forces have also been the vehicle for expression of mass patriotism, especially in times of national crisis: the Munich Crisis of September-October 1938 and the introduction of conscription in the following May stimulated recruiting to the Territorials and the RAFVR.⁶ This was very much an exception to the rule. The unsung heroes of the Reserve were the hard-core of highly motivated and committed women and men who were crucial in keeping the Reserve flame alight during by tolerating poor conditions, public indifference or even ridicule,⁷ and neglect by government. Such Reservists served out of a sense of duty and patriotism, but also because they found part-time military service personally and professionally satisfying. Historically, keeping these people onside was critical to the health, even the survival, of Reserve forces. As recently as 2010, the UK reserve forces were 'in serious decline in terms of numbers, capability and morale'.⁸

As EST reports have highlighted, while there is no room for complacency, FR2020 has been largely successful in addressing these problems. In 2019 an independent academic team argued that FR2020 had had the effect of 'reinvigorating the reserves'.⁹ The remarkable contribution made by Reserve Forces personnel to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is evidence of the steady evolution of the role of the UK's Reserve Forces over the last few years.¹⁰ Reserves now routinely amount to some 10% of the UK's deployed forces. Simply stated, generally commanders cannot deliver outputs without reserve input. Snapshots of the significance of Reserves include back-to-back tours in 2020 by Army Reserve units on Op TOSCA, the UK's component of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 7 Rifles being relieved by its sister battalion, 6 Rifles; and in the same year, elements of the Royal Yeomanry deploying to Poland as part of a US battlegroup (Op CABRIT). Moreover, drawing the upon evidence of the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey, EST reports reflect that Regulars have become much more appreciative of members of the Reserve. This cultural change, which is a process rather than an event, is highly significant.

The author, who began his career in military education, came to the external scrutiny team this year having had relatively little contact with the military for the last 6-7 years. His impression is that, peering behind the curtain, as it were, FR2020 has indeed brought about important changes to the Reserves. Compared to the recent and distant past they are more focused on the immediate need, are more flexible, and better integrated. However, this is a very good start rather than an end in itself. Specifically, the lack of thinking about the role of Reserve Forces should a future emergency demand major expansion of the Armed Forces needs to be addressed. More generally, the bold ambitions in RF30 must be to be realised to cement these reforms of FR2020, and to build upon them. If this is done properly, the days of Reserve Forces being the poor relations of the Regulars will be banished, to the benefit of all, not least the United Kingdom.

7. Reserve forces have always had something of an image problem with wider society, something which stretches back at least to the mid-nineteenth century.

8. Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces (London, The Stationery Office, 2011), p.17.

9. Patrick Bury and Sergio Catignani, 'Future Reserves 2020, the British Army and the politics of military innovation during the Cameron era', *International Affairs*, (Vol. 95, Issue 3, 2019), p.701. See however the authors' caveats.

10. Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces (London, The Stationery Office, 2011), p.6.

EXTERNAL REPORTING PROVISIONS OF THE DEFENCE REFORM ACT 2014

The Defence Reform Act 2014 placed a responsibility on Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations to submit an annual report on the state of the UK's Reserve Forces under the following provisions.¹

113A Duty to prepare report on volunteer Reserve Forces

- (1) An association must prepare an annual report on the state of the volunteer reserve forces so far as concerns the area for which the association is established.
- (2) A report on the state of the volunteer reserve forces is a report that sets out the association's assessment of the capabilities of the volunteer reserve forces, having regard to the duties that may be imposed on members of those forces by or under this Act or any other enactment.
- (3) The assessment referred to in subsection (2) must, in particular, include the association's views on the effect of each of the following matters on the capabilities of the volunteer reserve forces:
 - (a) the recruiting of members for the volunteer reserve forces;
 - (b) the retention of members of those forces;
 - (c) the provision of training for those forces;
 - (d) the upkeep of land and buildings for whose management and maintenance the association is responsible.
- (4) A report under subsection (1) must also set out the association's assessment of the provision that is made as regards the mental welfare of members and former members of the volunteer reserve forces.
- (5) An association must send a report under subsection (1) to the Secretary of State –
 - (a) in the case of the first report, before the first anniversary of the day on which the last Future Reserves 2020 report prepared before the coming into force of this section was presented to the Secretary of State, and
 - (b) in the case of subsequent reports, before the anniversary of the day on which the first report was laid before Parliament under subsection (6).
- (6) On receiving a report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
- (7) The duties under this section may, instead of being performed by an association, be performed by a joint committee appointed under section 116 by two or more associations in relation to their combined areas.
- (8) Where by virtue of subsection (7) a joint committee has the duty to prepare a report –
 - (a) references in subsections (1) to (5) to an association are to be read as if they were to the joint committee, and
 - (b) section 117(1)(a) (power to regulate manner in which functions are exercised) has effect as if the reference to associations were to the joint committee.
- (9) In subsection (5)(a), 'Future Reserves 2020 report' means a report prepared by the External Scrutiny Group on the Future Reserves 2020 programme.

1. Inserted in Part 11 of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (reserve associations), after section 113.

COUNCIL OF RESERVE FORCES' AND CADETS' ASSOCIATIONS EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM: TERMS OF REFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

1. The FR20 Report¹ was commissioned by the Prime Minister in October 2010 in recognition of the relative decline and neglect of Reserve Forces.

PURPOSE

2. The Commission identified² a requirement for an annual report on the overall state of the Reserve Forces. It recommended that the Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations (CRFCA) was best placed to meet this requirement, given its existing provision by (non-discretionary) statute to provide independent advice to the Defence Council and Ministers on Reserve Matters. The Defence Reform Act 2014 sets out the duty of the CRFCA to prepare annual reports of the state of the volunteer Reserve Forces. Roles and responsibilities in the production of the reports are set out in the Enabling Agreement.³

ROLE

3. The CRFCA External Scrutiny Team is to report to the Secretary of State for Defence on the state of the volunteer Reserve Forces and provide independent assurance to Parliament.

MEMBERSHIP

4. After consultation with the MOD, the RFCAs will appoint the Chair of the CRFCA External Scrutiny Team. The Chair will be appointed for a maximum of five years.
5. Membership of the External Scrutiny Team should be no greater than eight, to be decided by the Chair after consultation with the MOD through VCDS. It should provide representation from the three single Services, appropriate Regular and Reserve experience and independent expertise. Whilst its composition may change, the External Scrutiny Team must retain the expertise that enables the Chair to perform his duties effectively. The membership should include at least one member who is able to assess the provision made as regards the mental welfare of members and former members of the Reserve Forces.

BASELINE AND METRICS

6. 1 April 12 is to be taken as the baseline date from which progress of the Future Reserves 2020 Programme will be assessed.
7. RF&C will undertake coordinating activity with the single Services to ensure that the External Scrutiny Team has the assistance it requires to enable them to assess trends based on MOD manning and demographic information (such as age). Metrics to be routinely monitored are to be agreed in consultation with the MOD but may include:
 - a. Outflow rate and return of service;
 - b. Fit for Employment; Fit for Role; Fit for Deployment;
 - c. Percentage achieving bounty;
 - d. Gapping levels of Regular, Reserve, FTRS and Civilian Permanent Staff who support the Reserve community.

1. Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces. July 2011.

2. Para 104 (p. 43).

3. Enabling Agreement dated 7 October 2014.

ASSESSMENT

8. The External Scrutiny Team's report is to be set in the context of the ability of the Reserves to deliver capability required by Defence, and should assess the state of the Reserves including:
 - a. progress against delivery of the FR20 Mandates and in the context of the recommendations of the FR20 Report, the condition of the Reserves.and beyond the FR20 Programme:
 - b. the recruiting of members for the volunteer Reserve Forces;
 - c. the retention of members of those Forces;
 - d. the provision of training for those Forces;
 - e. the upkeep of land and buildings for whose management and maintenance the Associations are responsible.
9. CRFCA will be involved in the development of the Programme through the Reserves Executive Committee.

ACCESS

10. RF&C will assist in facilitating access to serving military personnel, sites and furnishing additional data as required.

COSTS

11. Funding to cover the External Scrutiny Team's total personal expenses in the order of £9-10K pa⁴ has been agreed. RF&C will provide advice on the submission of claims and recovery of expenses.

MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS

12. Media engagement, if necessary, is to be conducted through MOD DDC in conjunction with RF&C.

DATE AND FREQUENCY OF REPORTS

13. The External Scrutiny Team shall present a report to the Secretary of State for Defence annually, reflecting the requirements of the Defence Reform Act 2014.
14. The Secretary of State for Defence will deliver the report to Parliament.

4. This is recognised as an early estimation and reflecting steady-state costs beyond Yr1. CRFCA can bid for further funding as required as part of GIA.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE RESPONSE TO 2020 EST REPORT



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RECEIVED

23 June 2021

20 JUN 2021

Dear Major General Lalor,

Thank you for the External Scrutiny Team's 2020 report and for the work the team was able to undertake despite the difficulties presented to your visit programme by the Covid 19 restrictions. I am sorry for the delay in responding.

The report covers what was an exceptionally busy period for the Armed Forces, including the Reserves. The Annex to this letter contains Defence's response to the specific recommendations contained in the report but, as ever, I should also like to offer some more general comments.

I was pleased that the report acknowledges the immensely valuable support that the Reserves provided to Defence operations in the UK and overseas, and in particular to the national response to the Covid 19 pandemic. We are most grateful for the positive way in which reservists and their employers and families responded to call-out. Reservists did not hesitate to volunteer when asked and the vast majority of employers were extremely supportive.

The Reserves' contribution to Op RESCRIPT was a great demonstration of their utility and flexibility in dealing with a domestic emergency. Thanks to this 'can-do' approach, Reserves were instrumental in enabling the MOD to respond quickly and effectively to requests for help from other parts of government, while also maintaining the ability to continue its standing tasks. Reservists are among those continuing to offer support as Liaison Officers to other government departments, as planners and to support mobile testing and the Vaccination Task Force.

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
I should also like to record my thanks to the many people who organised and supported the mass mobilisation for the Covid response. This was carried out in far more complex circumstances than in 2012, which was the last time Defence needed to mobilise large numbers of reservists at pace. In the first instance, mobilisation centres had to comply with Covid 19 regulations, meaning there was less face-to-face interaction between reservists and mobilisation centre staffs and more use of remote processes. The Services also had to ensure they did not call out people who were key workers in their civilian jobs. This not only meant excluding people in medical and healthcare roles but also, as a less-obvious example, people who worked to produce, manufacture and distribute food. Aside from these considerations, Defence also had to engage with other government departments to determine how reservists and employers should be compensated when people who had been placed on furlough as a result of the pandemic were mobilised. These novel factors, I believe, set the mobilisation for Op RESCRIPT apart from others conducted in the past. I am proud of the way MOD and the Services were able to adapt to address these complex issues.

That is not to say, of course, that lessons cannot be learned and taken forward into future planning. The mobilisation of reservists to meet ongoing operational commitments is now routine business and enables reservists and employers to make proper plans plan for their absence. We can, however, use the experience gained in 2020 to help us decide whether we can make permanent adjustments to our routine processes, and how we can best adapt in the event that we need to mobilise at scale and at pace. The Ex Agile Stance Campaign Plan is in part intended to help clarify what Defence would need to do in such circumstances. If, for example, the Campaign Plan identifies a requirement within headquarters and chains of command for more training to be devoted to mobilisation policy and process, I expect this to be acted upon.

The recent publication of the Integrated Review and the Command Paper "Defence in a Competitive Age" have set the course for Defence in the coming decade. We have made it clear that the Reserves will have to play a key role in the evolution of our Armed Forces. The Reserve Forces 2030 review has also made proposals to increase the utilisation of the Reserves and we will continue to work to develop these ideas. The RFCAs, as organisations in their own right and through the Defence Relationship Management organisations, have helped Defence to achieve a better and mutually beneficial relationship with industry and employers and a greater understanding of the Armed Forces and Reserves in society. As our strategic thinking on the Future Force develops, we will look to the RFCAs for support in communicating our reasoning and intent to employers and to help us understand and address any questions and concerns they may have.

The past year has demonstrated Defence's ability to adapt its business processes in response to an unprecedented challenge. The propositions in the Command paper and the RF30 report will further transform the Reserves experience and will, I hope, see reservists being afforded an even greater range of opportunities to support Defence over the coming years. I am confident that we have a cohort of reservists who are motivated and ready for the challenge of becoming an ever more integrated element of the whole force.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ben Wallace', with a stylized flourish at the end.

THE RT HON BEN WALLACE MP

RFCA EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

20.1 That all three Services develop and maintain financial incentives to recruit ex-regulars, particularly for those trades and skills that are expensive to train and develop, acknowledging that this is a cost-effective method for manning the Reserve (paragraph 15).

Financial incentives (FI) can play an important role in recruiting and retaining personnel in key employment areas in certain circumstances. Recent Armed Forces Pay Review Body Focus Groups have provided feedback that an attractive offer for Reserve service is not primarily based around financial reward, but more to do with opportunity to maintain links with Regulars, camaraderie and diversity of activity. We believe, therefore, that the focus of the Reserves in addressing any recruitment concerns should be in continuing to deliver an 'offer' that attracts recruits without the use of an FI. As with all FIs, if compelling evidence emerged that it would be helpful, the idea could be reconsidered.

20.2 That the Reserve, through embedded part-time reserve staff posts, should be embedded in all aspects of the whole force

- a. across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) – particularly force design and development
- b. in the MOD Secretariat Policy Operations (SPO) – the MOD's operations cell – Standing Joint Command (SJC) Headquarters (HQ) and Land Operations Centre (LOC)
- c. as operational staff of higher HQs (para 19).

The increased utilisation of Reserves to support the broad range of Defence tasks can only help to break down any remaining cultural barriers between them and their Regular counterparts. Having more reservists working across the spectrum of roles in policy and command functions could be a way to reduce the risk of their requirements and utility being overlooked as policy and operational doctrine is developed. Going forward, the Services should aim to find the best person for the job, with a recognition that they will also need some individuals to fill particular posts for career development reasons. The SERVE jobs portal will be a means of bringing more opportunities to the attention of reservists. Longer term, the flexible service offer and the work to take forward the recommendations in the Reserve Forces 2030 review should lead to more opportunities for reservists across Defence.

20.3 That an assessment is made on the requirement for an uplift of personnel to meet the workload of managing a mobilisation and that additional personnel are mobilised to reinforce the RHQ of the mobilising unit, as enablers, before and throughout deployment (paragraph 21b(1)).

There are, of course, lessons to be taken forward from the response to the Covid 19 pandemic, including the ability to apply some flexibility to processes where it is appropriate to do so. The need to be flexible, however, also applies to the allocation of staff resources to advise on and manage mobilisation. The Services are equipped to manage the routine business of bringing reservists into permanent service and, as the team itself has observed, they were able to adapt to meet the increased demand

for support staff when there was an increased requirement to mobilise. The Agile Stance Campaign Plan has been designed to test and develop a responsive and agile strategic base. Identifying what will be needed to enable any future large-scale mobilisations and testing the findings is a key part of the plan.

20.4 That the issue of the provision of REME support to equipment heavy units, whether for training or operations, is revisited as the current process does not appear to be working (paragraph 21b(2)).

This issue is currently under review within the context of the ongoing work to refine the Army's response to both the Integrated Review and Reserve Forces 2030 (RF30). As part of the transformation to the Army announced in the Defence Command Paper, the Army Reserve will be fully integrated into the Regular structure of the future. This includes being fully integrated into the newly established Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). These BCT will be the means of grouping more deployable and sustainable whole force packages together, capable of integrated action. Work is ongoing to refine and test the future designs, capabilities and structures, and the Army are planning carefully to maximise the potential of their limited resources, particularly key equipment. This work is being cohered across the Defence Lines of Development and with RF30 through Army Reserve Transformation.

20.5 That:

- a. the services and the MOD review their plans for mobilisation so that it accommodates individuals as well as mobilising large numbers/units at short notice and rapidly.
- b. Reserve mobilisation expertise (staff posts with experience and expertise) is integrated into such areas as the SPO, SJC and LOC by creating embedded part-time reservist posts within those organisations
- c. the process for pre-mobilisation medicals is reviewed and appropriate standards adopted for overseas and homeland operations
- d. revised processes are exercised routinely not only in units but also the SPO, SJC and LOCs (paragraph 25).

Exercising mass mobilisation is now a factor at either the single Service level or within the Agile Stance Campaign Plan and could in future form part of the Defence Exercise Programme. Requirements for pre-mobilisation medicals will always be driven by operational requirement.

20.6 That MOD considers reviewing the capacity of the RF&C staff branch in the MOD in order that it is manned adequately to meet the demands it is set (paragraph 28).

When at its established strength, which it currently is, the Reserve Forces and Cadets division (RF&C) is appropriately staffed to deliver its function, which is to put the legal and policy mechanisms in place that enable reservists to be utilised. Conditions of Service, including pay and allowances, are managed as a whole force issue and are therefore appropriately the responsibility of other policy areas within the Defence People Team.

20.7 That there is scope to consider developing a mobilisation package in support of those reservists deploying on shorter DAOTO, which is different to one that supports those on longer specific named operations or those that are more akin to warfighting (paragraph 29).

There is no evidence that developing differentiated mobilisation packages depending on the task would increase the utilisation of volunteer Reserves, or that it would significantly reduce the costs of their utilisation. We would be reluctant to take any action that could risk eroding the protections and financial support that is available for employers and reservists when mobilised.

20.8 That the requisite training courses are adapted through modularisation, distribution, concentration and remote/virtual learning, and are assessed and measured on this basis (paragraph 32).

COVID conditions have acted as an accelerant to the trialling and testing of this model in many areas, where it has been extremely successful in mitigating the loss of face to face training opportunities. Learning from these most recent lessons, the challenge is to maximise the use of virtual and online delivery, making greater use of platforms such as the Defence Learning Environment and commercially available on-line training, while maintaining activity that cannot be carried out that way, such as simulators, or where students must act as a member of a team in very closely controlled safety critical situations.

20.9 That the MOD urgently produces a transparent and agreed costing method across all three Services to compare the cost of regulars and reservists, drawing on the Land Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCO) (paragraph 36).

The issue of the way that Defence utilise resources to meet its strategic objectives goes wider than comparing the costs of Regulars and Reserves. Defence operates a whole-force approach, blending military, civilian and contractor staff into a cohesive and powerful fighting force. Within the military alone, we draw on a range of commitment types, from Regular Service to Flexible engagements, Full Time Reserve Service, Mobilisation and attendance-based activity on Reserve Service Days. In the future, we expect the Defence force to encompass an even greater mix of workforce and commitment types. How these elements work together (and in combination with the wider National Security workforce and in the wider Defence sector) and how they are resourced to deliver Defence outputs remains under development as part of our future workforce planning capability. We have already made visible progress in breaking down the financial challenges to Reserves mobilisation through the Front-Line Commands optimising their planning processes.

20.10 That:

- a. any receipts raised through optimisation/rationalisation of the Volunteer Estate should be reinvested back into new estate or maintenance for the volunteer estate
- b. when the volunteer estate review reports, and if a programme of work is proposed or required, funding is identified and ring-fenced so

that it is not subject to subsequent in-year budgetary pressures (paragraph 44).

The RFCA Managed Estate Review has identified opportunities for rationalisation and improving utilisation of the RFCA estate. A key planning assumption within the cost model for the various options is for receipts to be reinvested within the RFCA estate to improve the condition, utilisation, enhance the lived experience and therefore capability. Any approach to implementation must be subject to more detailed studies, particularly in terms of funding strategy, and will need to cohere with the Integrated Review and RF30 outcomes. It will also be subject to the normal Department budgetary processes and procedures.

20.11 That Reservists submit an annual health declaration (paragraph 48).

This is being considered. However, any declaration would only be current from the date of completion and would not remove the requirement for a medical or medical consultation prior to a Reservist being brought into permanent service.

20.12 That, like the Royal Navy, the Army and Royal Air Force undertake periodic medicals for their reservists, linked to age/birthdays (paragraph 48).

The RAF already undertakes medicals on its reservists on joining, each time they re-engage and on mobilisation/demobilisation. The resourcing implications of carrying out more frequent routine medical screenings of reservists, perhaps to support their increased utilisation, will need to be considered by the RF30 implementation team in consultation with Defence Primary Healthcare.

20.13 That such innovation (medical) required to facilitate the rapid mobilisation of the Reserve for Operation RESCRIPT are developed further, codified and adopted by all three Services (paragraph 50).

The approach to Operation RESCRIPT showed that pragmatic medical standards could be set for UK tasking and this could set a useful precedent for future deployments. However, we must not expose individuals to unnecessary risk and those making medical decisions will always have to consider the nature of the task for which we are deploying personnel.

PREVIOUS REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY OF 2013 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 13.1 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 3, 4 & 8)

As a matter of priority the Department should issue a plain-English narrative which sets out the Reserves proposition: a narrative which is commonly adopted across all the Services and, as a minimum, covers the purposes of the Reserves; the manner in which they are likely to be used; and individual levels of obligation.

Recommendation 13.2 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 6 & 12)

FR20 manpower metrics should be more granular for the period to 2018 to demonstrate changes within the recruit inflow pipeline and should not concentrate solely on the achievement of Phase-2-trained Reservists.

Recommendation 13.3 (Link to the Commission's recommendation 26)

Priority must be given to fund and introduce quickly an effective management information system which accurately captures Reservists numbers; states of training, preparedness; availability; attendance; and skill sets.

Recommendation 13.4

More analysis is undertaken to determine the causes of 'manning churn', to better inform how retention measures could be better targeted.

Recommendation 13.5 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 2 & 21)

In parallel to development of pairing/parenting responsibilities, further analysis is needed for scaling of equipment and vehicle holdings at Reserve unit level, including the provision of low-tech simulation alternatives.

Recommendation 13.6 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 5, 6, 17, 18 & 23)

FR20 Army basing should take account of regional capacity to recruit, not just to facilitate proximity, and should also be phased to initially preserve current TA manpower until such time as alternative inflow is more fully developed.

Recommendation 13.7 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 8, 22 & 23)

That work is initiated to look at the potential to employ Reserves with critical skills, where their employment was best served in a reach-back rather than deployed role; and that their TACOS be examined for appropriate adjustment.

Recommendation 13.8 (Link to the Commission's report, Annex C, paragraph 8)

That senior military and political leadership initiate a comprehensive information campaign with the Services' middle management to address the cultural change necessary to secure FR20, drawing on the narrative we recommend above.

SUMMARY OF 2014 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 14.1 Further work on Whole Force and the New Employment Model, coupled with the desirability of easier transfers between Regular and Reserve service, suggest that the necessity of merging the Armed Forces' Act and the Reserve Forces' Act should be kept under review.

Recommendation 14.2 The narrative developed for the White Paper should be updated to take account of FR20 delivery to date and used more extensively to market the value of Reserve service and the recruiting offer. It should also be used more extensively cross-Government.

Recommendation 14.3 FR20 measures which seek to bring down the average age of Reservists should be phased to follow those measures which will rely heavily on Reservist knowledge and experience for their introduction.

Recommendation 14.4 The single Services should examine the scope to apply a 'special measures approach' to turning round those units and sub-units most in need of assistance in reaching FR20 targets.

Recommendation 14.5 The single Services should examine a range of measures which better preserve the corporate memory of their Reserve components, including procedures for recording whether and how savings measures are planned to be restored during programming.

Recommendation 14.6 Recruiting processes should be subject to continuous improvement measures, with recognition that central marketing and advertising campaigns must be complemented by appropriately funded local/unit activity to nurture and retain applicants through the process.

Recommendation 14.7 Final decisions on Reserve Centre laydown and unit/sub-unit closures should be re-tested against local recruiting capacity and retention factors.

Recommendation 14.8 In order to ensure that necessary differences between Regular and Reserve service are appropriately managed, the single Services should consider the reintroduction of a dedicated Reserve career management staff branch (predominantly manned and led by Reservists) within their Personnel Headquarters.

Recommendation 14.9 Command appointments of Reserve units should continue to provide opportunity for part-time volunteer officers. When part-time volunteers are appointed, command team manning of the unit should be reviewed to ensure that the commanding officer is fully supported with no gapping in key headquarters posts.

Recommendation 14.10 The MOD should consider the option to restore the FR20 Commission's proposal that a contingency reserve fund should be established to be available for short duration domestic operations making use of Reserves.

SUMMARY OF 2015 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 15.1 The MOD give further consideration to how it will safeguard the ability of Reserves to play a proportionate part in resilience operations, especially once the Reserves are at full manning and would otherwise have to dilute funds for annual training to offset costs.

Recommendation 15.2 Working within the existing governance system, build more inter-Service cooperation on experimentation and best practice on recruiting and retention, whether or not initiatives are universally adopted.

Recommendation 15.3 The three Services should review the separate roles played by the national call centres, the Armed Forces Careers Offices, the recruiting field forces and Reserve units to ensure that they are clearly optimised for Reserve recruiting.

Recommendation 15.4 The MOD and the Services should review the medical entry standards required of recruits and ensure that the screening contracts are appropriately incentivised and assured to achieve success.

Recommendation 15.5 The Services should initiate work to determine the recruiting resources necessary to ensure steady state manning of the Reserve beyond the FR20 period.

Recommendation 15.6 The Services should examine what more could be done to enhance manning through retention-positive measures, at least in the short term, including bespoke extra-mural activities targeted at the Reserve.

Recommendation 15.7 FR20 planning and risk mitigation should increasingly turn more attention to the growth of capability within the Reserve component, rather than a slavish pursuit of numerical growth.

Recommendation 15.8 Army Reserve basing requirements should be revisited as a consequence of availability of funds to deliver the original basing concept and on the evidence of other FR20 achievement; link to Recommendation 15.10.

Recommendation 15.9 DIO and the Services should review their multi activity and support contracts and, where relevant, explore ways in which they can be amended to ensure that they are Reserve-friendly.

Recommendation 15.10 The Services should conduct a command-led stock-take on all aspects of FR20 implementation by the end of FY 2015/16 and share lessons learned; link with recommendation 15.8.

SUMMARY OF 2016 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 16.1 An urgent contract review of the Army Recruiting Partnership.

Recommendation 16.2 The Services undertake more granular analysis within their data gathering, to reduce the risk of specialist manning gaps in the final years of FR20 and beyond.

Recommendation 16.3 The high incidence of medical deferrals and time to resolution remain under close scrutiny in order to reduce both.

Recommendation 16.4 The Royal Navy and Army absorb recent innovations in officer Phase 1 training into their core officer development activity, as the issue will require sustained attention well beyond the timeframe of FR20.

Recommendation 16.5 Consideration be given to greater cross-pollination, shared practice and coordination between the three Services in the officer recruiting environment, particularly in the area of achieving greater penetration of the Higher and Further Education recruiting hinterland.

Recommendation 16.6 The Services keep under review the impact of losing Op FORTIFY enhancements (or Service equivalents) and, where appropriate to sustain recruiting beyond 2019, bring relevant elements into their core activity.

Recommendation 16.7 The Services examine units which have a significant young officer deficit to determine whether a poor proposition might be the cause and, if so, to assess whether it can be legitimately improved.

Recommendation 16.8 The Army consider how the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force use their Reserves in order to develop a better understanding of potential use of Auxiliaries in the Army Reserve; and that such analysis helps shape policies for the future employment system.

Recommendation 16.9 The Army revisits the decision to withdraw LADs from Reserve units to create REME battalions.

Recommendation 16.10 The manner in which Reserves can be routinely employed on national operations or for back-fill be revisited.

Recommendation 16.11 The Reserve narrative be reviewed to ensure it cannot be interpreted as intent to prevent use of Reservists for routine mobilisation and on national operations.

Recommendation 16.12 Work on defining the Army Reserve officer career pathway be re-invigorated.

Recommendation 16.13 Defence reviews whether a more flexible range of employment terms should be considered, to better incentivise recruitment and to provide more agility within a whole force approach to employment.

Recommendation 16.14 As options are considered for disposal of Regular estate, decisions are not taken before current or potential usefulness to Reserve capability-building has also been taken into account.

Recommendation 16.15 MOD and the Services recognise incomplete cultural change will be the main impediment to FR20 delivery and long-term Reserve sustainability, and introduce specific measures to inculcate cultural change.

Recommendation 16.16 The importance of localism for effective sub-unit command be addressed by simplifying systems where possible; providing adequate permanent staff support; and keeping training requirements at practical levels.

SUMMARY OF 2017 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 17.1 A repeat recommendation that a formal contract review of the Recruiting Partnership be undertaken. (Paragraph 19)

Recommendation 17.2 That the continued employment of RSUSOs is revisited. (Paragraph 20)

Recommendation 17.3 That the use of medical waivers during recruiting should be better advertised to RN and Army units, and other relevant participants in the recruiting chain. (Paragraph 21)

Recommendation 17.4 That the Army should examine where the medical waiver authority is best lodged. (Paragraph 21)

Recommendation 17.5 That the single Services should review their recruiting medical contracts to ensure assessments are carried out with a greater degree of consistency and common sense. (Paragraph 23)

Recommendation 17.6 That the Services identify which units have experienced the most successful officer recruitment and explore the best means by which their successes can then be exported to less successful units. (Paragraph 24)

Recommendation 17.7 The Army should revitalise work to create a Reserve officer career pathway. (Paragraph 28)

Recommendation 17.8 That the Army develop and implement a policy to support appropriately Reserve unit commanding officers when the incumbent is a part time volunteer. (Paragraph 30)

Recommendation 17.9 That the MOD, Joint Forces Command and the single Services review the terms under which Reserves are included on or in support of operations, in order to develop protocols which make their inclusion easier. (Paragraph 35)

Recommendation 17.10 That the Services resist short-term in-year budgetary palliatives which directly or indirectly reduce routine Reserve activity. (Paragraph 37)

Recommendation 17.11 That the Services now initiate work to determine optimum return-of-service/retention rate(s) for their Reserves and put in place measures to achieve them, with the same vigour that they have applied in their recruiting effort. (Paragraph 39)

Recommendation 17.12 That work on the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing VE until a new strategy can be implemented. (Paragraph 48)

Recommendation 17.13 That the MOD update the work on mental health in the Services that it has undertaken with King's College and commission fresh work to look specifically at the current situation for Reserves. (Paragraph 51)

SUMMARY OF 2018 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 18.1 Given the challenging recruiting environment encountered by the three Services and the failure of the DRS, we recommend that the MOD and Services do not take further savings measures from the FR20 £1.8bn funding to manage FY18 in-year financial pressures. (Paragraph 15)

Recommendation 18.2 We would welcome an update on the proposed revisions to JSP 950 when these actions are completed. (Paragraph 22)

Recommendation 18.3 Given the criticality of DRS to the inflow of applicants to recruits, we recommend that 'Hypercare' is continued until all three services are confident that DRS works as intended reducing the 'time of flight' between application and being loaded on a Phase 1 recruit training course. (Paragraph 26)

Recommendation 18.4 Linked to paragraphs 16-26 above, until the frictions in the recruiting system are ironed out, whether induced by DRS or Service policies, we recommend that Op FORTIFY measures, such as the RSUSO, are continued beyond FR20 until the Services hit their trained strength FR20 targets and they are confident that manning is on an even plateau. (Paragraph 27)

Recommendation 18.5 We recommend that the three Services continue to examine that their courses - particularly those run by Training Schools - policies and processes and are adapted to take account of the needs of the reservist. (Paragraph 32)

Recommendation 18.6 We recommend that MOD produce an agreed costing method to compare the cost of regulars and reservists, drawing on the above work and that done by the Land Environment Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCOC), and examine the opportunities to further increase their utility and value to Defence. (Paragraph 36)

Recommendation 18.7 We continue to recommend that MOD should consider the option to restore the FR20 Commission's proposal to establish a contingency reserve fund to be available for short notice and duration operations. (Paragraph 37)

Recommendation 18.8 That the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing Reserve estate until the new strategy is implemented. (Paragraph 49)

SUMMARY OF 2019 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 19.1 The MOD and the Services do not take further savings measures from the FR20 £1.8bn funding, given the FR20 programme trained strength targets have been missed and ask MOD and all Services to clarify what funding remains, and plans to spend it over the next four years. (Paragraph 7)

Recommendation 19.2 That: the Services determine what is the optimum percentage of Reservists within a deployed force (between 5-8%), which meets the requirement to mobilise Reservists to sustain the Whole Force Model, while being sustainable in the long-term, and fund this accordingly in their annual spending programme. (Paragraph 12)

Recommendation 19.3 That they [initiatives to allow for mobilisation on training tasks and a tiered mobilisation package for DAOTO] are developed further as a matter of priority, particularly the tiered mobilisation package as it would broaden the range of manning levers available to Commander, and thus enhance the utility of the Reserve, and answer the requirements to modernise, exploit and use the Reserve more efficiently as identified by the Commission. (Paragraph 16)

Recommendation 19.4 That:

- The three Services review their ongoing support arrangements for Reserve recruiting, to ensure the successful lessons of FR20 are not discarded; and
- RSUSOs are taken onto units' permanent strengths now in recognition of the vital role they play. (Paragraph 18b)

Recommendation 19.5 That similar work being done by the Australians and Canadians to minimise the steps in the [recruiting] process (including introducing a one-stop shop) is studied closely before the contract is re-let. We further recommend that ambitious targets should be set – one month if there are no issues, and six months if there are, and success or failure should be judged on these targets. (Paragraph 19)

Recommendation 19.6 That the Services continue the drive to adapt their Service policies and practices to take account of the needs of the Reservist. (Paragraph 21)

Recommendation 19.7 We recommend that the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force consider adopting such a system in order to ensure reservist knowledge and input is considered during policy formulation and operational planning, and be able to grow a Reservist (part-time) two star officer. (Paragraph 22)

Recommendation 19.8 Identified and approved FR20 [infrastructure] projects are not subject to the 'exceptions, suspension' regime in order that agreed funding for the estate is spent as intended and not delayed. (Paragraph 25)

Recommendation 19.9 That the three Services further promulgate the OH, rehabilitation, dental and mental health services in order to make Reservists fully aware of the medical services available to them. (Paragraph 27)

Recommendation 19.10 That consideration is given to a means whereby Reservists submit some form of annual health declaration and/or have routine medicals linked to birthdays. (Paragraph 29)

SUMMARY OF 2020 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 20.1 That all three Services develop and maintain Financial Incentives to recruit ex regulars, particularly for those trades and skills that are expensive to train and develop, acknowledging this is a cost effective method for manning the Reserve. (Paragraph 15)

Recommendation 20.2 That the Reserve, through embedded part-time reserve staff posts should be involved in all aspects of the Whole Force:

- Across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) – particularly force design, and capability development.
- In the MOD (Secretariat Policy Operations (SPO)) – the MOD's operations cell – Standing Joint Command (SJC) Headquarter (HQ) and Land Operations Centre (LOC).
- As operational staff of higher HQs. (Paragraph 19)

Recommendation 20.3 That an assessment is made on the requirement for an uplift of personnel to meet the workload of managing a mobilisation and that additional personnel are mobilised to reinforce the RHQ of the mobilising unit, as enablers, before and throughout deployment. (Paragraph 21b(1))

Recommendation 20.4 That the issue of the provision of REME support to equipment heavy units, whether for training or operations, is revisited as the current process does not appear to be working. (Paragraph 21b(2))

Recommendation 20.5 That:

- The Services and the MOD review their plans for mobilisation so that it accommodates individuals as well as mobilising large numbers/units at short notice and rapidly.
- Reserve mobilisation expertise (staff posts with experience and expertise) is integrated into such areas as the SPO, SJC and LOC by creating embedded part-time reservist posts within those organisations.
- The process for pre-mobilisation medicals is reviewed and appropriate standards adopted for overseas and homeland operations.
- Revised processes are exercised routinely not only in units, but also the SPO, SJC and LOC. (Paragraph 25)

Recommendation 20.6 That MOD considers reviewing the capacity of the RF&C staff branch in the MOD in order that it is manned adequately to meet the demands it is set. (Paragraph 28)

Recommendation 20.7 That there is scope to consider developing a mobilisation package in support of those reservists deploying on shorter DAOTO, which is different to one that supports those on longer specific named operations or those that are more akin to warfighting. (Paragraph 29)

Recommendation 20.8 That the requisite training courses are adapted through modularisation, distribution, concentration and remote/virtual learning, and are assessed and measured on this basis. (Paragraph 32)

Recommendation 20.9 That the MOD urgently produces a transparent and agreed costing method across all three Services to compare the cost of regulars and reservists drawing on the Land Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCO). (Paragraph 36)

Recommendation 20.10 That:

- Any receipts raised through optimisation/rationalisation of the Volunteer Estate should be reinvested back into new estate or maintenance for the Volunteer Estate.
- When the Volunteer Estate Review reports, and if a programme of work is proposed or required, funding is identified and ring-fenced so that it is not subject to subsequent in-year budgetary pressures. (Paragraph 44)

Recommendation 20.11 That Reservists submit an annual health declaration. (Paragraph 48)

Recommendation 20.12 That, like the Royal Navy, the Army and Royal Air Force undertake periodic medicals for its reservists, linked to age/birthdays. (Paragraph 48)

Recommendation 20.13 That such innovations [medical] required to facilitate the rapid mobilisation of the Reserve for Operation RESCRIPT are developed further, codified and adopted by all three Services. (Paragraph 50)



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DEFENCE STATISTICS - RESERVE MANNING ACHIEVEMENT & TRENDS¹

Headline Figures

Table 1. Total and trained strength of the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20).

	2015 1 Apr	2016 1 Apr	2017 1 Apr	2018 1 Apr	2019 1 Apr	2020 1 Apr	2021 1 Apr	Change 2020/2021
All Services								
Total strength	30,810	34,760	36,220	36,260	36,400	37,010	37,410	+ 400
Trained strength	24,630	27,270 II	31,360	32,200	32,560	32,920	32,700	+ 220
Maritime Reserve								
Total strength	3,160	3,540	3,560	3,600	3,850	3,870	4,080	+ 200
Trained strength	1,980	2,350	2,560	2,760	2,830	2,870	2,870	- 10
Army Reserve								
Total strength	25,440	28,670	29,940	29,710	29,470	29,930	30,030	+ 100
Trained strength	21,030	23,030 II	26,660	29,960	27,070	27,300	26,940	- 360
RAF Reserves								
Total strength	2,220	2,540	2,730	2,950	3,080	3,200	3,300	+ 100
Trained strength	1,620	1,890	2,150	2,480	2,660	2,740	2,890	+ 150

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)


Appendices:

1. Maritime Reserves
2. Army Reserves
3. RAF Reserves
4. Officer data
5. Accompanying notes to tables


1. Data is drawn from the Defence Statistics Report as at 1 Apr 2020.

Maritime Reserve

Maritime Reserve Strength



Maritime Reserve Cumulative Financial Year to date Intake




Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force)

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

Maritime Reserve Quarterly Gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow




Note:


Gains to trained strength figures comprise personnel who complete Phase 2 training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the Maritime Reserve.

Army Reserve

Army Reserve Strength



Army Reserve Cumulative Financial Year to date Intake



Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force).

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

Army Reserve Quarterly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow




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
Gains to trained strength figures comprises personnel who complete Phase 1 (post-October 2016) training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the Army Reserve. Break in series represents the **change in definition of Army Trained Strength** in October 2016 from Phase 2 to Phase 1 trained. Gains to trained strength and outflow from trained strength data are unavailable for the month of September 2016 as a result.

RAuxAF

RAF Reserve Strength



RAF Reserve cumulative financial year to date Intake




Note:

New Entrants comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force).

Trained Direct Entrants comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

RAF Reserve monthly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow



Note:

Gains to trained strength figures comprises personnel who complete Phase 2 training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the RAF Reserves.

Officers

Table 2a Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the Maritime Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019	1 Apr 2019 to 31 Mar 2020	1 Apr 2020 to 31 Mar 2021
Officers strength at start of period	900	1,040	1,120	1,160	1,230	1,250
Intake to Officers	220	200	150	190	160	100
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	210	180	140	180	150	100
Rank to Officer in the Maritime Reserve	80	50	60	70	60	20
Regulars	80	100	70	90	70	50
University Service Units	10	10	~	~	10	10
No previous service	10	20	~	10	10	~
Outflow from Officers	80	120	110	120	140	110
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	20	20	20	20	40	30
Regulars	~	10	10	10	20	10
Left the Armed Forces	60	100	100	90	110	80
Officers strength at end of period	1,040	1,120	1,160	1,230	1,250	1,240

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Table 2b Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the Army Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019	1 Apr 2019 to 31 Mar 2020	1 Apr 2020 to 31 Mar 2021
Officers strength at start of period	4,490	4,840	5,100	5,410	5,600	5,940
Intake to Officers	760	680	750	660	780	690
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	640	600	670	600	700	620
Rank to Officer in the Army Reserve	100	100	120	120	160	150
Regulars	320	300	290	280	350	230
University Service Units	170	140	140	110	130	140
No previous service	110	90	80	60	80	80
Outflow from Officers	400	430	440	480	440	550
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	120	170	140	150	150	240
Regulars	70	100	80	90	90	130
Left the Armed Forces	280	260	300	330	290	310
Officers strength at end of period	4,840	5,090	5,410	5,590	5,940	6,080

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Table 2c Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the RAF Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019	1 Apr 2019 to 31 Mar 2020	1 Apr 2020 to 31 Mar 2021
Officers strength at start of period	340	390	430	530	620	680
Intake to Officers	100	80	170	150	140	170
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	90	80	150	130	130	160
Rank to Officer in the RAF Reserve	20	10	~	20	20	10
Regulars	60	60	110	80	90	120
University Service Units	-	~	-	-	-	~
No previous service	-	-	20	20	10	10
Outflow from Officers	50	40	70 r	60	80	90
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	20	10	40 r	30	20	40
Regulars	~	~	~	10	10	20
Left the Armed Forces	30	30	30	30	60	40
Officers strength at end of period	340	430	530 r	620	680	760

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Accompanying Notes to Tables

1. Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) includes Volunteer Reserves who are mobilised, HRR and Volunteer Reserve personnel serving on ADC or FTRS contracts. Sponsored Reserves provide a more cost effective solution than Volunteer Reserves are also included in the Army Reserve FR20. Non Regular Permanent Staff (NRPS), Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI) and University Officer Cadets and Regular Reservists are excluded.
2. Trained Strength comprises military personnel who have completed Phase 1 and 2 training for Maritime Reserve, the Army Reserve (prior to 1 October 2016) and the Royal Air Force Reserves. Following the change in definition of trained strength from 1 October 2016, trained strength for the Army Reserve comprises of personnel who have completed Phase 1 training.
3. Intake and outflow statistics are calculated from month-on-month comparisons of officer strength data. There has been a minor change in the methodology used to produce Reserves statistics from 1 April 2017. This now allows us to capture individuals who intake and outflow within the same month. For example, if an individual joins on 3 March and leaves on 29 March they are now counted as an intake and an outflow under the new methodology, whereas previously this would not have been identifiable. The net effect of this change on our Statistics is negligible and the figures above would not differ from that calculated previously by greater than ten personnel. This change does, however, improve both the accuracy and efficiency of our processes by, for example improving identification of those Officers who previously served in University Service Units.
4. Intake to the FR20 shows the most recent previous service recorded on JPA including those serving in another Reserve Service. Personnel may have had a break in service and may have served in more than one role. Intake from University Service Units figures just show that someone has been in a University Service Unit at some point in our data; they may not have moved straight into the FR20 directly after leaving. Only ex-Cadets are counted as an intake from University Service Units. Army Officers include Army Officer Cadets.
5. Outflow from the FR20 includes those personnel moving to another part of the Armed Forces within the calendar month. 'Left the Armed Forces' may include those who have a break in service before joining another part of the Armed Forces.
6. Intake and outflow from the Regular Forces includes transfers from/to another service.
7. University Service Units includes University Royal Navy Units (URNU), University Officer Training Corps (UOTC), University Air Squadrons (UAS) and Defence Technical Undergraduate Scheme (DTUS). Individuals counted ex-Cadets with a prior assignment type of one of these on the JPA system. Note that an individual does not have to have been serving in the University Service Unit associated with their future Reserve Service e.g. an individual may have joined the Army Reserve after serving in the URNU.

Rounding


Figures have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in '5' have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias. Totals and subtotals have been rounded separately and may not equal the sum of their rounded parts.

Symbols


- r Figure revised since last publication
- ~ 5 or fewer
- Zero
- .. Data not available
- || Discontinuity marker

RESERVIST MOBILISATION AND DEPLOYMENTS


Maritime Reserve activity



Army Reserve activity



RAF Reserve activity



EXTERNAL SCRUTINY 2021 REPORT - MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

- 21.1** That the same intensity of focus and consistency that led to the success of Army regular recruiting is applied to the Reserve, particularly given that the reductions to regular strength increase the importance of having a fully manned Reserve.
- 21.2** That the Reserve, through embedded part-time reserve staff posts, should be involved in all aspects of the Whole Force across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) – particularly force design and capability development.
- 21.3** That the MOD produces a transparent and agreed costing method across all three Services and, in addition, a contingency fund is identified and ring-fenced to allow that use so that this almost perennial debate, or friction, does not arise.
- 21.4** If reservists are to be deployed on operations using RSDs more frequently and as a matter of policy, we recommend that the MOD reinvigorate the work to develop an appropriate package of support.
- 21.5** That RF30 takes forward work to simplify the TACOS available and guidelines, or policy (rules) for the appropriate TACOS to meet a given situation; i.e. RSDs for routine training; enhanced RSDs for short operational deployments (maximum 28 days) whether homeland resilience or DAOTO; and full mobilisation for longer deployments and more kinetic operations.
- 21.6** That Defence should be more forward leaning in making use of appropriate civilian courses and the recognition and accreditation of civilian qualifications, in lieu of military courses.

SUMMARY OF PRIORITIES FOR 2021/22 WORK

In addition to the formal requirements set out in the Reserve Forces Act, the themes below will be examined during the 2021/22 reporting period.

Policy Review

- Implementation of RF30 recommendations
- Tri-Service TACOS
- Integration of Maritime Reserve Directive
- Implementation of IR on Army Reserve units
- Project ASTRA

Capability

- Employer Engagement
- Medical preparedness

Manning, Recruiting, Retention

- Manning Target
- Recruiting and retention success
- Training policies – recognition of civilian qualifications

Specific Visits

- Headquarters RN, Army, RAF and Strategic Command
- RFCA arranged visits in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Midlands
- Exercise PURPLE WARRIOR
- Exercise AGILE STANCE

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM – MEMBERSHIP

Chairman:

Major General (Retd) S F N Lalor CB TD

Members:

Rear Admiral (Retd) C J Hockley CBE DL

Brigadier (Retd) P R Mixer OSTJ QVRM TD DL

Air Commodore (Retd) P E O'Neill CBE

Captain (Retd) I M Robinson OBE RD RNR

Colonel (Retd) G Straughan OBE TD

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